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ESTEE LAUDER INT' L. , INC. v. WORLD WIDE MARINE SERV. INC. 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 14 January 1991 
923F.2d238 
An insurance company which authorizes its insured to issue "special marine policies" is liable to those third parties for 
whom the policies are issued regardless of the third parties' knowledge of such policy. 
FACTS: In February 1987 appellant, Estee Lauder Interna­
tional, Inc. (Estee Lauder) employed World Wide Marine 
Service Inc. lWorld Wide), a trucking company, to transport 
cosmetics from Melville, Long Island to Puerto Rico. The truck 
carrying the goods was stolen in New Jersey while on its way to 
Port Elizabeth, and only a small portion of the $180,000 worth of 
cosmetics was ever recovered. Estee Lauder received $147,000 
for the stolen cosmetics from their insurer, Commercial Union 
Insurance Companies (Commercial Union). World Wide was 
insured under an open cargo policy issued by Travelers Indemnity 
Company (Travelers). Under this open cargo policy, World Wide 
was authorized to issue "special marine policies" on Travelers' 
forms. These policies provided warehouse to warehouse "all 
risks" insurance coverage to shippers who employed World 
Wide to move their cargo. Although the open cargo policy had 
specific restrictions pertaining to the issuance of special marine 
policies, these restrictions were not printed on the special 
marine policies. Exercising their authorizaton under the open 
cargo policy, World Wide issued a special marine policy for 
$52,000 to cover the Estee Lauder cosmetics. The premiums for 
this policy were paid by World Wide. After the theft, World 
Wide immediately contacted Travelers and submitted claim 
documentation. Travelers accepted the claim documentation 
but then denied coverage on the grounds that Estee Lauder had 
other insurance and that World Wide had violated the open 
cargo policy by issuing the policy to obtain legal liability cover­
age for itself. 
Estee Lauder and its subrogated insurer, Commercial Union 
(hereinafter referred to collectively as Estee Lauder! brought 
an action against World Wide and Travelers tor the $147,000 
loss. Prior to the trial Estee Lauder tiled three motions tor 
summary judgment. The first motion, made against World 
Wide, resulted in a judgment against World Wide for the cargo 
loss. The other two motions were against Travelers to enforce 
the special marine policy. These motions were denied because 
neither party could locate a countersigned original of the docu­
ment, and the policy would not be binding without the counter­
signature. The district court held for Travelers stating that the 
special marine policy was issued but that it was unauthorized 
since World Wide had paid the policy premiums and Estee 
Lauder had never submitted a written request for the policy and 
therefore it was not binding on Travelers. 
ISSUE: Is an insurance company, which authorizes its insured 
to issue "special marine policies", liable to third parties for whom 
the policies are issued regardless of the third parties knowledge of 
such policy? 
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 
that Travelers, which had authorized World Wide to issue spe­
cial marine policies was liable to Estee Lauder, the third-party 
beneficiary to the policy. In reaching this decision the court 
relied on the district court finding that the special marine policy 
had been issued. Since the policy is a contract, the court touhd 
Estee Lauder to be a third-party beneficiary of the policy and 
therefore able to bring action to enforce the policy terms. The 
court went on to disagree with the remainder of the district 
court holding, stating it was not relevant which party paid the 
policy premiums in determining Travelers liability. The court 
also discarded the finding that the special marine policy was 
was unauthorized since Estee Lauder did not make a written 
request tor the policy as required in the open cargo policy. The 
court deemed the requirement merely a policy cond1t10n and 
that Travelers had waived this condition by accepting the policy 
premiums. Based on these findings the district court was re­
versed and Travelers was held to be bound to the special marine 
policy that World Wide issued for Estee Lauder. 
Kathleen O'Gara '92 
QUINTERO v. KLA VENESS SHIP LINES 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 16 October 1990 
914F.2d 717 
A district court may enjoin further relitigation of a choice-of-law determination made pursuant to its forum non conveniens 
dismissal of a seaman' s personl injury. 
FACTS: A Filipino sailor, Rosauro Quintero lQuinteroJ, was 
injured while unloading a Liberian-registered, Norwegian­
owned ship, the M!V Barwa, docked in the port of New Orleans. 
In September 1986, Quintero tiled suit against Torvals Klave­
ness & Co. A/S (KlavenessJ, who managed the vessel, in the 
Eastern District of Louisiana seeking damages for his injury. In 
July 1987, Quintero tiled a parallel suit for the same injuries in 
Louisiana state court, later including in his petition the four 
Norwegian interests lA/S Otra; Harald Moller Investment A/S; 
Galva Limited A/S; and Gorrissen and Klaveness A/S henceforth 
referred to as the "Barwa interests") who owned the vessel. In 
April 1988, a federal court issued a final judgment dismissing 
Quintero's suit under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court 
judgment and remanded the case instructing the district court 
to reconsider its decision under the doctrine established in In re 
Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 821 
F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987), certiorari granted and judgment 
vacated, Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Lopez, 490 U.S. 
1032 (1989), on remand to, In re Air Crash Disaster Near New 
Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 883 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1989). 
After remand Quintero was denied a motion dismissing his 
federal suit. The district court granted Klaveness's motion to 
dismiss for forum non conveniens with prejudice after determining 
that Philippine law should govern the controversy, and further 
granted Klaveness's request for an injunction preventing Quintero 
from relitigating the choice-of-law issues in state court. Quintero 
appealed to the Fifth Circuit claiming that the district court had 
abused its discretion by enjoining him from relitigating in state 
court, in. dismissing the claim with prejudice on forum non 
conveniens, in not granting his motion for voluntary dismissal, 
and additionally, for refusing to compel Klaveness to answer 
interrogatories dealing with the choice-of-law issue. Quintero 
also claimed the district court had erred in deciding that Philippine 
law should govern and in making the choice-of-law determination 
prior to dismissal tor forum non conveniens. 
ISSUES: ( 1! Whether a district court in a maritime case may 
enjoin further relitigation in state court of a choice-of-law issue? 
(2) Whether the district court committed error in 
granting a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, with 
(continued ... .) 
